Almost all OECD countries mandate paid vacation days, yet whether such work-time regulation corrects a market failure has been difficult to answer without exogenous variation in leave across employers. We test the classic lemons explanation: if generous leave attracts less productive workers, no firm wants to be the generous outlier. We exploit a 2012 German court ruling that outlawed age-based vacation entitlements, mandating firms that tied leave to age to grant additional paid vacation days to workers under 30. Combining matched employer-employee data with cross-industry variation in the pre-reform discontinuity at age 30, we examine how expanding leave affects worker selection, retention, and pay. Across several pre-determined measures of worker quality, firms that have to add vacation days attract lower-quality new hires, and our estimates suggest that the associated productivity losses exceed the direct cost of the leave. Adverse selection thus raises the private cost of offering leave above its social cost, a key mechanism behind arguments for a mandate. At the same time we find that the cost incidence of the regulation is mostly on firms, whereas workers benefit, as turnover falls and young mothers return to full-time work sooner. We find no offsetting wage or employment response, ruling out the pass-through predicted by compensating-differentials models.
Wage Surging: An Analysis of Firms' Search during Hiring Difficulties (joint with Zoë Cullen and Mitchell Hoffman)
Many firms find it difficult to fill vacancies, yet little is known about how they adjust wages as a search progresses. Using administrative data and two RCTs on a major US staffing platform, we uncover a puzzle: firms rarely raise wages on unfilled positions on their own, yet opt into automated wage raises-executed by the Platform on their behalf-at many multiples their manual adjustment rate. Demand rises further when the tool conditions raises on labor market activity that firms do not observe but the Platform does, illustrating that information frictions contribute to the lack of wage adjustment. We suggest that managers find it hard to disentangle whether an unfilled vacancy reflects high reservation wages or a thin applicant pool, and formalize this as a learning problem. Three lines of evidence support the mechanism: belief elicitations, quasi-experimental variation in the information shown to firms, and experimental demand for information-conditioned tools. Finally, exploiting quasi-random Platform-initiated wage bonuses, we show that wage-surging tools increase match rates substantially, improve employment outcomes and help labor markets clear.
Willingness to Pay for Workplace Amenities (joint with Massimo Anelli)
Reservation Wages and the Wage Flexibility Puzzle (joint with Alan Manning and Barbara Petrongolo)
Labor Supply and Innovation in Entertainment: Evidence from TV (joint with George Fenton)
Immigration and the Top 1% (joint with Arun Advani, Lorenzo Pessina, Andrew Summers)
Can Helping the Sick Hurt the Able? Incentives, Information and Disruption in a Welfare Reform (joint with Nitika Bagaria, Barbara Petrongolo, John van Reenen)